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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Luis Sanchez appeals from his judgments of conviction after a jury found
him guilty of two counts of sexual battery of a minor and four counts of lewd conduct for
acts with two different minors, J.C. and T.C. He was sentenced to an aggregate unified
sentence of life, with ten years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district
court erred in allowing the charges involving T.C. to be joined with the charges involving
J.C.

Mr. Sanchez also asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct where a

State’s witness commented on Mr. Sanchez’s invocation of his right to counsel,
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
well as Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Finally, Mr. Sanchez asserts that even if
this Court finds that the errors individually were harmless, they cumulatively deprived
him of his right to a fair trial.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Supreme Court Docket No. 43293 (Bingham County case number 2014-4176
(hereinafter, the J.C. case)) and Supreme Court Docket No. 43294 (Bingham County
case number 2014-6454 (hereinafter, the T.C. case)) have been consolidated for
appellate purposes under No. 43293. (R., pp.10, 303.)
These cases involve alleged incidents of inappropriate sexual touching occurring
more than eight years before the incidents were reported or charged. In the first case,
the J.C. case, Mr. Sanchez allegedly had five instances of sexual contact with a child he
and his wife were babysitting, 8 year old J.C., over the course of several days in 2006.
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In the T.C case, Mr. Sanchez allegedly touched 8 year old T.C. over the course of two
nights in 2006, while she was spending the night at his house, with his daughter.
In the J.C. case, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Sanchez with three
counts of lewd conduct and two counts of sex abuse involving J.C. (R., pp.36-38.) The
State alleged that Mr. Sanchez rubbed his genitals against J.C’s clothed buttocks,
touched her breasts, made her watch a pornographic video, rubbed his penis against
her vagina, and rubbed his hand on her vagina. (R., pp.36-38.) The acts were alleged
to have taken place between April 1, 2006 and June 30, 2006.

(R., pp.36-38.)

Mr. Sanchez entered a not guilty plea to the charges. (R., p.50.)
After the preliminary hearing in the J.C. case, charges in a new case, the T.C.
case, were filed which alleged three counts of lewd conduct involving T.C., a different
victim with whom Mr. Sanchez had also allegedly inappropriately interacted in 2006.
(R., pp.304-306.) Apparently T.C. had come forward after the preliminary hearing in
J.C.’s case. (11/3/14 Tr., p.15, Ls.9-16.) The State alleged that Mr. Sanchez touched
T.C.’s vagina with his hand on two occasions and had T.C. touch Mr. Sanchez’s penis.
(R., pp.324-326.) The subsequently-filed Information charged Mr. Sanchez with two
counts of lewd conduct that allegedly occurred between April 17, 2006 and June 12,
2006, and one count of sexual abuse of a minor, for conduct that allegedly occurred
between June 13, 2006 and August 31, 2006. (R., pp.324-326.)
The prosecutor filed a motion to consolidate the two cases. (R., pp.58-59.) The
prosecutor requested consolidation because “the cases arise from the same time period
and factual situations, and the defendant has the same defense attorney and the
defendant would not be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation thereof.” (R., p.58.)
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Defense counsel opposed consolidation. (11/3/14 Tr., p.12, Ls.24-25.) The motion was
argued before the district court on November 3, 2014.

(11/3/14 Tr.; R., p.63.)

Additional briefing by the prosecution and defense was submitted pursuant to the district
court’s request (R., pp.95-98, 101-105), and which the district court issued a written
order granting consolidation (R., pp.174-175, 401-402). The district court’s order did not
contain any factual findings or conclusions of law, instead holding “Having heard the
parties’ arguments and having reviewed the record, this Court finds that the State’s
motion should be granted.”

(R., pp.174-175, 401-402.)

Prior to the start of trial, the district court dismissed Count III, sexual abuse of a
minor, of the T.C. case on the State’s motion. (Trial Tr., p.119, L.25 – p.120, L.24.)
The case then proceeded to trial.
The State first called Detective Richard Nalley to the stand. (Trial Tr., p.144,
Ls.18-19.) Detective Nalley testified regarding his investigation of the incidents and his
interview of Mr. Sanchez.

(Trial Tr., p.146, L.12 – p.150, L.16.)

During cross-

examination, defense counsel asked him about the substance of his interview with
Mr. Sanchez, and Detective Nalley’s response included a reference to Mr. Sanchez’s
invocation of his right to have an attorney present. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-10.)
The State called 16 year old J.C. (Trial Tr., p.150, L.17 – p.151, L.21.) J.C.
testified that, sometime in the spring of 2006, Mr. Sanchez and his wife babysat her and
her sisters. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.24 – p.155, L.25; p.181, L.25 – p.182, L.13.) At the time,
J.C. was eight years old, and her sisters were seven and one. (Trial Tr., p.155, Ls.1117.) J.C. testified that her mother dropped them off the first day, and, right after they
arrived, Mrs. Sanchez left and Mr. Sanchez told the kids about a new video game.

3

(Trial Tr., p.156, L.11 - p.157, L.15.) All the children—Mr. Sanchez’s kids and J.C.’s
oldest sister—went upstairs to see it, but Mr. Sanchez asked J.C. to wait and then she
went downstairs with him to a white closet in a storage room. (Trial Tr., p.157, L1 –
p.158, L.7.) J.C. testified that Mr. Sanchez asked her about keeping a secret, and then
he moved behind her, touching her breasts on top of her clothes and he rubbed his
clothed penis against her clothed buttocks. (Trial Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.159, L.24.) She
testified that the next encounter was in Mr. Sanchez’s bedroom, where he had her lay
down on the bed and rubbed his penis against her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.162, L.19 –
p.164, L.24.) J.C. testified that the second day she was babysat at Mr. Sanchez’s
house, he made her watch a video of adults having sexual intercourse for approximately
five minutes. (Trial Tr., p.167, L.16 – p.169, L.17.) Later that same day, at night,
Mr. Sanchez went into the bedroom where J.C. was sleeping and he touched her
vagina and rubbed it. (Trial Tr., p.171, L.2 – p.172, L.14.) On the night of the third day
she was babysat, Mr. Sanchez took J.C. downstairs to the white storage closet again.
(Trial Tr., p.176, L.25 – p.177, L.1.) He touched her breasts and vagina with his hands.
(Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.2-24.) J.C. testified that she did not tell her mother what had
happened until 2013 because she was afraid of Mr. Sanchez. (Trial Tr., p.179, L.21 –
p.180, L.20.)
Sixteen year old T.C. was called as the next witness. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.5-15.)
She testified that sometime in the spring of 2006, she was eight years old and spending
the night with her cousins, Mr. Sanchez’s children, at their house. (Trial Tr., p.190, L.14
– p.192, L.9.) T.C. testified that everyone was asleep in the living room when she woke
up in the night. (Trial Tr., p.192, L.10 - p.193, L.20.) She went into the kitchen because
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she saw a light. (Trial Tr., p.193, Ls.18-20.) Mr. Sanchez was in the kitchen, painting a
picture. (Trial Tr., p.193, Ls.19-25.) She asked to help him paint and got into his lap,
and while she was painting, he touched her vagina with his hand. (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.225.)
T.C. testified that another incident took place a few days later, while she was
again spending the night with her cousins at Mr. Sanchez’s house. (Trial Tr., p.196,
L.14 – p.197, L.13.) While everyone was asleep in the living room, T.C. was awake but
pretended to be asleep when Mr. Sanchez sat down beside where she was sleeping
and put her hand on his “scrotum area” and rubbed it. (Trial Tr., p.197, L.5 – p.198,
L.22.) She testified that Mr. Sanchez told her it was a secret and not to tell anyone, but
he never threatened her. (Trial Tr., p.195, Ls.5-16; p.199, Ls.20-24.) T.C. did not tell
anyone of the incidents until 2014. (Trial Tr., p.200, Ls.6-21; p.202, Ls.2-8.) Further,
she acted as if nothing had happened at any of the following family events that took
place from 2006 until 2014. (Trial Tr., p.201, Ls.2-23; p.207, L.14 – p.208, L.8.)
The defense’s first witness was Mr. Sanchez. He denied any sexual contact with
either J.C. or T.C. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.23 – p.237, L.11.) He testified that, at the time the
incidents allegedly occurred, he had sustained a work injury and could not move his
right hand. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.21 – p.230, L.16; Defendant’s Trial Exhibit A.) He was
home during the day and helped his wife take care of J.C. and her sisters because he
could not work due to the injury. (Trial Tr., p.229, L.18 – p.230, L.25.) He could not
move the hand for two years following the accident. (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.20-22.) This
was corroborated by a copy of Mr. Sanchez’s Worker’s Compensation form showing the
date the accident was reported was June 12, 2006. (Trial Tr., p.239, L.14 – p.240, L.16;
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State’s Trial Exhibit 7.) The State also called the owner of the house Mr. Sanchez and
his family were living in from April 1, 2006 to the first part of July, 2006. (Trial Tr., p.209,
L.8 – p.212, L.2.) Scott Stecklein, Mr. Sanchez’s former employer and the owner of the
house Mr. Sanchez was living in from April 1 to the first part of July, 2006, also testified
that Mr. Sanchez hurt his arm so he stopped working for him. (Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.1012.)
The defense next called Alejandra Sanchez, Mr. Sanchez’s wife who had been
married to him for 16 years. (Trial Tr., p.241, L.11 – p.242, L.10.) She testified that she
had not left the family’s home during the time she was babysitting J.C. and her siblings
because she had four children of her own and she did not know how to drive, thus the
incidents with J.C. could not have happened as J.C. described. (Trial Tr., p.242, L.15 –
p.243, L.19.) Following Mrs. Sanchez’s testimony, the defense rested. (Trial Tr., p.245,
Ls.18-19.)
Ultimately, the jury convicted Mr. Sanchez of the five counts of sex abuse and
lewd conduct against J.C. and of two counts of lewd conduct against T.C.

(Trial

Tr., p.279, L.15 – p.281, L.9; R., pp.218-219, 441-442.)
At sentencing, the State asked the district court to order the counts to be served
consecutively, and asked the district court to sentence Mr. Sanchez to an aggregate
unified sentence of 155 years, with 29 years fixed. (4/27/15 Tr., p.19, L.17 – p.20, L.8.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Sanchez to an aggregate unified sentence of life, with
ten years fixed, and it ordered all sentences to run concurrently. (4/27/15 Tr., p.26,
Ls.2-17; R., pp.264-267, 477-480.) Mr. Sanchez filed Notices of Appeal timely from the
district court’s Judgments of Conviction. (R., pp.279-281, 490-492.)
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it granted the State’s motion to consolidate
because the charges were not properly joined?

2.

Did the State commit misconduct when its witness commented on Mr. Sanchez’s
invocation of his right to counsel?

3.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr. Sanchez’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process of law violated because the accumulation of
errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Granted The State’s Motion For Joinder
A.

Introduction
Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it granted

the State’s motion to join the charges involving T.C with the charges pertaining to J.C.
Mr. Sanchez asserts that the charges should have never been joined together because
the alleged abuse occurred at different times, in different locations in the house,
involved different types of sexual contact, and was not part of a common scheme or
plan.
B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a court improperly joined offenses pursuant to I.C.R. 8 is a question of

law, over which this Court exercises free review. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564
(2007).
C.

The District Court Erred When It Granted The State’s Motion To Consolidate
Because The Charges Were Not Properly Joined
The State claimed that consolidation was appropriate because the alleged events

occurred during the spring and summer of the same year, the girls were the same age,
and the incidents took place at Mr. Sanchez’s home while the girls were being watched
by Mr. Sanchez and his wife and when the victims were playing with the Sanchez
children. (R., p.101.) The State asserted that “[w]here several cases name the same
defendant of similar crimes that also involve separate victims of similar age and similar

8

circumstances which also include the same time period, the consolidation is
appropriate.”

(R., p.102.)

The State encouraged the trial court to consider

consolidation through the balancing test of whether this creates an unfair prejudice to
the defendant under I.R.E. 403. (R., pp.102-104.) The State claimed that the facts in
each case were so closely related that the testimony of both victims would be
admissible to show a common scheme or general plan dealing with young children in
Mr. Sanchez’s household. (R., p.104.) The State conceded that the cases did not arise
out of the same incident, but urged the district court to consolidate in order to prevent
the children from testifying on multiple occasions regarding Mr. Sanchez’s modus
operandi and general plan, because presenting the testimony of T.C. and J.C. together
“aids the jury in determining the credibility of the witnesses.” (R., p.104.)
Mr. Sanchez opposed the prosecutor’s motion to consolidate. (11/3/14 Tr., p.12,
Ls.24-25; R., pp.95-98.) At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel noted that the
cases alleged two different victims and the defense was concerned that, if the cases
were tried together, Mr. Sanchez would be unduly prejudiced because the jury would be
more likely to believe that sexual misconduct had occurred and might decide the case
without holding the prosecutor to its burden on each count—due to the testimony of
more than one victim. (11/3/14 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-9.)
Defense counsel also objected because the cases did not arise out of the same
incident or transaction and did not show a common scheme or plan.

(R., p.96.)

Counsel asserted that the alleged acts were committed on two different victims on
completely separate occasions and no nexus between the two crimes was alleged.
(R., pp.96-97.)

Defense counsel also noted that the two cases did not have any
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overlapping evidence which would be most efficiently presented during a single trial.
(R., p.97.) Mr. Sanchez asserted that joinder of the two cases was improper because
they did not arise out of the same incident or transaction and the State alleged nothing
to show a common scheme or plan as required by I.C.R. 8. (R., p.97.)
The district court requested additional briefing from the parties, and took the
matter under advisement. (11/3/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.7-10.) The district court granted the
State’s motion to consolidate, but it did not place any analysis or reasoning in its order,
holding, “Having heard the parties’ arguments and having reviewed the record, this
Court finds that the State’s motion should be granted.” (R., pp.174-175.)
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho
Criminal Rules. Field, 144 Idaho at 565; State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784, 790 (Ct. App.
2007). Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may order two or more
informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been joined in a single
information. I.C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same information
if the offenses, “are based on the same act or transaction or on two (2) or more acts or
transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.”
I.C.R. 8(a). Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient nexus between
them in order to be properly joined.

State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 358, 361-362

(Ct. App. 2003). Whether the initial joinder was proper depends upon what is alleged by
the State, not what the proof at trial ultimately shows. Field, 144 Idaho at 565 (quoting
State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975). Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a
defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as
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corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State v. Wilbanks,
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).
Mr. Sanchez maintains that the charges involving J.C. and T.C. were improperly
joined because the offenses were wholly unconnected and were not part of a common
plan or scheme.
The facts of this case are most like those in State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho
757 (2015). In Orellana-Castro, Mr. Orellana-Castro was charged with unlawful sexual
contact with his two stepdaughters. Id. 158 at 759. The State moved for joinder, and
the district court found that the evidence showed a common scheme or plan where: (1)
the two girls were defendant’s step-daughters; (2) they were close in age; (3) the abuse
allegedly occurred in the home; and (4) the alleged incidents occurred during a two-year
period. Id. 158 Idaho at 762. The district court found the two girls involved different
types of sexual abuse—genital contact versus touching, but that the difference was
insufficient to indicate a lack of a common scheme or plan. Id.
However, the Orellana-Castro Court faulted the district court for failing to conduct
the analysis mandated by the Court in Grist and Johnson—“a common scheme or plan
must embrace the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof
of one tends to establish the other.” Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762 (emphasis in
original). The Court held that the district court abused its discretion for failing to conduct
the requisite analysis. Id. The Orellana-Castro Court also held that the jury instruction
charging the jury with deciding each count separately was insufficient to alleviate the
prejudice from improper joinder. Id. In analyzing whether the error was harmless, the
Court first noted that there was no physical evidence corroborating the girls’ testimony.
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Id. The Court found there was a risk that evidence from one girl would convince the jury
of the defendant’s propensity to engage in sexual molestation when evaluating evidence
regarding the other girl or her credibility.

Id. at 763.

Thus, the existence of two

accusers would enhance their credibility, and even a jury instruction cautioning against
considering such evidence as probative of propensity would have been sufficient to
prevent such an error from prejudicing the defendant. Id.
In State v. Grist, Mr. Grist was alleged to have sexually abused his live-in
girlfriend’s daughter from when she was ten years old until she graduated from high
school. Id. at 50-51. He was alleged to have had her sit on his lap and touched her
breasts, buttocks and vagina. Id. Mr. Grist’s ex-wife’s daughter testified that she lived
with Mr. Grist when she was eight until she was thirteen and he would have her sit on
his lap or lay down with him and he would touch her breasts and buttocks. Id. The
Grist Court held that evidence of a defendant’s other bad acts “may be admissible ‘if
relevant to prove . . . a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two or
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other.’” Id.
at 54-55 (emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the judgment of
conviction in Grist, holding the trial court had not conducted the proper analysis
regarding the admissibility of evidence of Mr. Grist’s prior bad acts admitted to prove a
common scheme or plan. Id. at 55.
The Grist Court provided instruction to the trial courts, “We once again caution
the trial courts of this state that they must carefully examine evidence offered for the
purpose of demonstrating the existence of a common scheme or plan in order to the
[sic] determine whether the requisite relationship exists.” Grist, 147 Idaho at 55.
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The basis alleged by the State for joinder of the charges in this case was that the
facts in each case were so closely related that the testimony of both victims would be
admissible to show a common scheme or general plan dealing with young children in
Mr. Sanchez’s household. (R., p.104.) This allegation is not sufficient to meet the
standard articulated in I.C.R. 8(a), and the argument is strikingly similar to the argument
made by the State in Johnson, where the Idaho Supreme Court held joinder was error
because the similarities in the two incidents were “far too unremarkable to demonstrate
a ‘common scheme or plan’ in the defendant’s behavior.” See Johnson, 148 Idaho at
669.

In addition, the analysis of whether charges were part of a common plan or

otherwise connected together looks to whether there existed a continuity of action or
purpose. See State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565-66 (2007) (holding joinder was
erroneous where, “[t]here is nothing to show that at the time Field committed the offense
against T.B. he had a plan to also commit an offense against H.P. specifically, or to
commit an offense against someone he would be ‘babysitting’ two years later”).
Neither the assertions contained in the State's Motion to Consolidate, nor the
facts underlying the charges, meet the legal standards for joinder. Nor did the district
court conduct the analysis mandated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Grist and
Johnson—a common scheme or plan must embrace the commission of two or more
crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. Like the
district court’s errors in Orellana-Castro, the district court in this case made no mention
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of those two cases and did not identify what it contended was Mr. Sanchez’s common
scheme or plan.1 See Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762.
Applying Grist and Orellana-Castro to the facts of his case, Mr. Sanchez asserts
that the result must be the same—a finding that the charges do not constitute a
common plan. Although the girls were both children in Mr. Sanchez’s home, it is there
that the similarities end.

J.C. was at Mr. Sanchez’s house, being watched by

Mr. Sanchez and his wife while her mother was working. (Trial Tr., p.151, L.24 – p.155,
L.25.) T.C. was at Mr. Sanchez’s house, staying the night with his children, her cousins.
(Trial Tr., p.190, L.14 – p.192, L.9.) Although the girls were the same age at the time
and neither lived in the family home, the alleged abuse was strikingly different - ranging
from alleged rubbing of Mr. Sanchez’s genitals against the clothed buttocks of J.C. (Trial
Tr., p.158, L.8 – p.159, L.24) to touching of the breast (Trial Tr., p.158, Ls.15-16) and
vagina (Trial Tr., p.171, Ls.20-24) of J.C., to having J.C. watch a video of adults having
intercourse (Trial Tr., p.167, Ls.22-25), to rubbing his penis against J.C.’s vagina (Trial
Tr., p.163, Ls.19-20), versus touching T.C.’s vagina while she sat on his lap late one
night (Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.2-25) and using her hand to rub his scrotum (Trial Tr., p.197,
L.5 – p.198, L.22); and the abuse occurred at different times. Even the times of day
were different—with J.C. the majority of the alleged events occurred during the middle
of the day, with T.C., the alleged events occurred exclusively at night. Furthermore,
there is no evidence supporting a common scheme or plan as there is no evidence that
at the time Mr. Sanchez engaged in inappropriate conduct with either girl he had a plan

The district court in Mr. Sanchez’s case did not have the benefit of the Orellana-Castro
decision as the Idaho Supreme Court’s Opinion was not published until June 23, 2015.
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to also commit an offense against the other. There was no similarity in the way the
events unfolded—with J.C. it was alleged that he sought her out at various locations in
the home and brought her into a secure, unoccupied room. (Trial Tr., p.158, L.1 – 178,
L.1.)

Alternatively, during the nighttime incident, he made sure she was in an

unoccupied bed before engaging in sexual touching. (Trial Tr., p.170, L.10 – p.172,
L.20.) In contrast, with T.C., it was alleged, in the first incident, that Mr. Sanchez was
painting in another room which was adjacent to a room in which she was sleeping over
with Mr. Sanchez’s daughter and other children. (Trial Tr., p.192, L.6 – p.193, L.21.)
T.C. awoke in the night and initiated contact with Mr. Sanchez by asking him about the
painting, after which the encounter turned sexual. (Trial Tr., p.193, L.16 – p.194, L.25.)
The second incident, in which Mr. Sanchez was alleged to have paused beside the
place where she was sleeping and used her hand to stroke his scrotum, was not similar
to any of the events with J.C. (Trial Tr., p.197, L.5 – p.198, L.22.) That is, none of the
touching scenarios with one girl were the same as the other.
In Field, the Idaho State Supreme Court analyzed what a common plan was for
the purposes of joinder and relied upon cases addressing common plans or schemes
under I.R.E. 404(b). Id. at 565-566. All of the cases relied upon in Field were decided
prior to the clarification provided by State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009), State v.
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010), and their progeny. Field was the first case to offer
clarification of what constituted a common plan or scheme under the modern
understanding of I.R.E. 404(b).
In Grist, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the “common scheme or plan”
contemplated by I.R.E. 404(b) is “a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
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of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the
other. . . .” Grist, 147 Idaho at 54–55 (citations omitted).
In Johnson the Court explained that “at a minimum,” this rule requires, “evidence
of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that” the defendant has committed
the same kind of misconduct in the past. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. The Court
continued, stating that, “[t]he events must be linked by common characteristics that go
beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to
establish that the same person committed all the acts.” Id. (citations omitted).
Mr. Johnson was charged with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and the
Court held that the district court erred in admitting evidence the defendant had abused
his sister when she was about the same age as the victim in the charged offense.
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. The Court found similarities in the charged and uncharged
incidents (victims were both young girls about the same age, both victims were younger
members of the defendant's family for whom the defendant was an “authority figure,”
and in both cases, the abuse took the same form) to be “far too unremarkable to
demonstrate a ‘common scheme or plan’ in the defendant's behavior.” Id. The Court
clarified that evidence showing only “generalized similarities,” between charged and
uncharged conduct, such as the victim's sex or age, or the means by which a defendant
gains access to them “is more accurately described as inadmissible evidence merely
demonstrating the defendant's predisposition for opportunistically molesting children.”
Id. at 669 n. 5 (citing Grist, 147 Idaho at 54). Therefore, to be admissible under Rule
404(b), “evidence of prior misconduct must show more than a superficial similarity to the
nature and details of the charged conduct, but must instead show that the defendant's
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charged and uncharged conduct is linked in a way that permits the inference that the
prior conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up to the charged
offense.” State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 8-11 (2013).
In this case, there is no evidence to show a common scheme or plan. The
evidence merely shows that Mr. Sanchez may have engaged in other inappropriate
conduct on other occasions. The evidence does not demonstrate a planned course of
connected behavior as is required under the modern application of I.R.E. 404(b).
Notably, the similarities between Mr. Sanchez’s alleged abuse of J.C. and T.C. are
essentially the same or less compelling than the general similarities in Johnson—the
victims’ sex and age, and the means by which the defendant gained access to the
victims. Further, the charges are not linked in a way that provides any inference that
the conduct towards either J.C. or T.C. was planned as part of a course of conduct
leading up to the abuse of the other person. Therefore, the charges do not show a
common scheme or plan.

Rather, they are merely suggestive of Mr. Sanchez’s

predisposition for sexually abusing underage females, precisely the kind of character
evidence barred by Rule 404. As such, joinder in this case was improper because there
was an insufficient nexus pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) and, as a result, the district court erred
when it granted the State’s motion to join the charges related to T.C. with the charges
related to J.C.
Further, this is a case where the only evidence that the crimes occurred was
statements from the alleged victims that Mr. Sanchez had inappropriate sexual contact
with them. There was no physical evidence nor were there any witnesses to the alleged
conduct.

Hearing testimony from both girls is tantamount to presenting character
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evidence which is normally excluded due to well-founded fears that a jury may find a
defendant guilty based upon the idea that if he had done something before he is more
likely to do it again, acting in conformity with his character to engage in bad acts.
Mr. Sanchez asserts that because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a “he
said, she said” case, had the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been
different. As the Idaho Supreme Court recognized in Orellana-Castro, “Evidence of
prior sexual misconduct with young children is so prejudicial that there is a reasonable
possibility this error contributed to [Defendant’s] conviction.” Id. 158 Idaho at 763
(quoting Johnson, 148 Idaho at 670). Additionally, Mr. Sanchez asserts that there is
valid concern that the jury had difficulty reaching a verdict in his case because the jury
asked to see the police reports mid-way through deliberations. (Trial Tr., p.276, L.23 –
p.277, L.18; R., p.178.) For these reasons, and for the reasons articulated in section C
above, the district court erred in consolidating the charges related to T.C. with those
related to J.C.
II.
The State Committed Misconduct Where Its Witness Commented On Mr. Sanchez’s
Invocation Of His Right To Counsel
A.

Introduction
At trial, through the testimony of Detective Nalley, the jury was made aware that

during Detective Nalley’s questioning of Mr. Sanchez, he exercised his Miranda2 right to
right to an attorney. Mr. Sanchez asserts that the State’s elicitation of the fact that
Mr. Sanchez invoked his right to counsel violated his due process right as protected by

2

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as
Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution.
B.

The State Committed Misconduct Where Its Witness Commented On
Mr. Sanchez’s Invocation Of His Right To Counsel
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the

Fourteenth Amendment as well as Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution),
guarantees a criminal defendant the right not to be compelled to testify against himself.
U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV, Idaho Const. art. I, § 13. Thus, suspects in criminal cases
have a constitutional right to remain silent. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 46769 (1966) (holding that, under certain circumstances, a criminal suspect must “be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent”).
Further, this right bars the prosecution from commenting on a defendant’s postMiranda invocation of the right to remain silent. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 61719 (1976), Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965). As the Idaho Supreme
Court has recognized, “because of the promise present in a Miranda warning, a
prosecutor may not use evidence of post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for either
impeachment, Doyle v. Ohio, [426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)], or as substantive evidence of
guilt in the State’s case-in chief, Wainwright v. Greenfield, [474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986)].”
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 60 (2011). Representatives of the State, such as
police officers, have the same duty as prosecutors not to improperly comment on a
defendant’s silence. Id. at 61. However, “[a] prosecutor may use evidence of preMiranda silence, either pre- or post-arrest, for impeachment of the defendant.” Id. at 60.
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The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination also
carries a right to counsel that may be invoked during custodial interrogation prior to
charges being filed. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 (1981); Miranda, 384
U.S. 436, 469-470 (deriving a suspect’s right to an attorney during questioning from his
right to remain silent).
Once the accused has exercised his right to counsel, “the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Once the accused
expresses his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he is not subject to
further interrogation until counsel has been made available, unless the accused initiates
further communications with the police. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.
In this case, during defense counsel’s cross-examination of Detective Nalley,
counsel inquired regarding the substance of the detective’s interview with Mr. Sanchez:
Q. And did you -- denied that he ever showed her -- showed J[.C.]
pornographic videos; is that right?
A. I would have to refer to my reports. I don’t believe we got that far into
the questioning before he invoked his right to have an attorney present.
(Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-10.) Although Detective Nalley offered an unsolicited comment on
Mr. Sanchez’s invocation of his rights, Detective Nalley’s actions are imputed to the
State. Parker, 157 Idaho at 147; Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61.
In Mr. Sanchez’s case, it was clearly impermissible for Detective Nalley to talk
about Mr. Sanchez’s exercise of his constitutional right. As the Idaho Supreme Court
has observed, a reference to a defendant’s exercise of his right to silence is improper,
for any purpose. See White, 97 Idaho at 714-715, 551 P.2d at 1350-1351. Moreover,
given the context of Detective Nalley’s testimony, it is evident he is commenting on
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Mr. Sanchez’s silence to raise an inference of guilt. In other words, if Mr. Sanchez were
innocent and had done nothing wrong, he would have continued talking to Detective
Nalley and answering his questions. Accordingly, it was improper for Detective Nalley
to tell the jury that Mr. Sanchez exercised his constitutional right to silence pending the
arrival of counsel, rather than continue talking to him.
C.

The Prosecutorial Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error
Even though Mr. Sanchez did not object at trial, this Court is able to review the

issue as fundamental error, pursuant to State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). To
show fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate that the alleged error: “(1)
violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is
clear or obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not
contained in the appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228; State v. Corbus, 151 Idaho 368, 371
(Ct. App. 2011), rev. denied.

The record in this case demonstrates that the

prosecutorial misconduct was a fundamental error under the Perry test.
1.

The Error Violated Mr. Sanchez’s Constitutional Rights

Mr. Sanchez’s right to silence and due process and fair trial rights were violated
when the State’s witness told the jury that Mr. Sanchez did not answer any questions
regarding whether he had J.C. watch pornography because Mr. Sanchez invoked his
right to an attorney. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-10.) Reference to a defendant’s invocation of
a constitutional right deprives an accused of his constitutional right to due process and a
fair trial. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474
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U.S. 284, 292 (1986); State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 715 (1976); see also State v.
Betancourt, 151 Idaho 635, 640 (Ct. App. 2011) (holding that reference to defendant’s
refusal to consent to search constituted fundamental error).
In Wainwright, two officers testified that after the accused was given Miranda
warnings, he exercised his right to remain silent and stated that he wished to speak with
an attorney before answering any questions. Id. 474 U.S. at 287. The prosecutor, at
closing, recapped the defendant’s repeated refusals to answer questions without first
consulting an attorney in an effort to rebut the defendant’s claim of insanity. Id. The
Court held, “What is impermissible is the evidentiary use of an individual’s exercise of
his constitutional rights after the State’s assurance that the invocation of those rights will
not be penalized.” Id. at 295. The Wainwright Court treated the defendant’s requests
for an attorney the same as an exercise of the right to silence.
In this case, Mr. Sanchez’s invocation of his right to an attorney was used by
the State’s witness to explain why Mr. Sanchez did not answer any questions about
whether J.C. viewed pornography. (Trial Tr., p.150, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Sanchez invoked his
right to an attorney, and the simultaneous right to silence prior to the attorney’s
presence. The introduction of such information into evidence penalized Mr. Sanchez in
that the jury likely inferred that Mr. Sanchez’s silence arose from his guilt.
Due to the prosecution’s witness’s improper testimony as to Mr. Sanchez’s
invocation of his right to have an attorney present, Mr. Sanchez was deprived of his
right to remain silent, his right to due process of law, and his right to a fair trial
guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and the State of Idaho. Thus, the
first prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.
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2.

The Violation Of Mr. Sanchez’s Constitutional Rights Is Clear And Obvious
From The Record

The record is clear that the State’s witness provided unsolicited testimony that
Mr. Sanchez invoked his right to have counsel present during an interview with law
enforcement. (Trial Tr., p.149, L.15 – p.150, L.11.) Failure to object to the testimony
was not a tactical decision by Mr. Sanchez’s counsel. There is no strategic advantage
to permitting the State to introduce evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s invocation of silence
pending the presence of counsel. The jury would necessarily infer from Officer Nalley’s
outburst that Mr. Sanchez asked for an attorney because he was guilty.

The

misconduct is a clear and obvious violation of Mr. Sanchez’s right to due process and a
fair trial. As such, the second prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228.
3.

The Error Likely Affected The Outcome Of The Case

Information that Mr. Sanchez invoked his right to counsel during an interview with
law enforcement likely contributed to the jury’s guilty verdicts.
Throughout trial, the prosecutor used a theme that Mr. Sanchez had secrets.
(Trial Tr., p.138, Ls. 6-8 (at opening argument, “this is a case about secrets”); p.263,
Ls.7-14 (at closing argument, “this was a case about secrets”); p.267, Ls.15-18 (again
at closing argument, “Jose Luis Sanchez wanted you to not know his secret”).) The
additional implication that, when interviewed, Mr. Sanchez invoked his right to counsel
supported the prosecutor’s theme that Mr. Sanchez was refusing to speak without an
attorney present in order to protect his secret.
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Further, this is not a case where the prosecution presented overwhelming
evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s guilt.
Mr. Sanchez’s guilt.

There was no physical evidence establishing

Mr. Sanchez denied the acts occurred, both during his initial

interview with law enforcement and during trial. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.19 – p.237, L.21;
p.149, L.17 – p.150, L.4.) These facts highlight the overall weakness of the evidence
against Mr. Sanchez.

Thus, the prosecutor’s indirect elicitation of Mr. Sanchez’s

assertion of the right to remain silent as evidence of his substantive guilt likely
contributed to the jury’s guilty verdict. Therefore, the violation of his rights affected the
outcome of his case. Thus, the third prong of the Perry test is met. See Perry, 150
Idaho at 228.
Because the State’s misconduct constituted a fundamental error, this Court
should vacate his Mr. Sanchez’s convictions and remand his cases for a new trial.
III.
Even If The Above Errors Are Individually Harmless, Mr. Sanchez’s Fourteenth
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law Was Violated Because The Accumulation Of
Errors Deprived Him Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Mr. Sanchez asserts that if the Court finds that even if the above errors were
individually harmless, the district court’s errors combined amount to cumulative error.
The cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which
by itself might be harmless, but when aggregated, show the absence of a fair trial in
contravention of the defendant's constitutional right to due process. State v. Paciorek,
137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). In order to find cumulative error, this Court must
first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the alleged errors and then
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conclude that these errors, when aggregated, denied the defendant a fair trial. State v.
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).
Mr. Sanchez asserts that the district court’s errors in his trial amounted to actual
errors depriving him of a fair trial. His arguments in support of this assertion are found
in sections I - II above, and need not be repeated, but are incorporated herein by
reference.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgments of
conviction and remand his cases for new trials. Additionally, he requests that upon
remand his cases be severed and that the trials for the charges related to J.C. and T.C.
proceed separately.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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